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Abstract: An agnostic pluralist approaches inquiry with the assumption that it is possible for more than one account
of the phenomenon in question to be correct. A monist approaches inquiry with the assumption that only one account
of the phenomenon in question is correct. The purpose of my paper is to support the claim that agnostic pluralists are
less susceptible to a type of bias that I call dialectical bias than monists.
Keywords: bias mitigation, monism, pluralism

1. Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to offer some support for the claim that inquirers that adopt an
agnostic pluralists stance towards some phenomenon 𝑋 are less prone to certain dialectical
biases than inquirers that adopt a monist stance towards 𝑋. In §2 I define and discuss the notion
of dialectical bias. In §3 I distinguish monist, pluralist and agnostic pluralist approaches to
inquiry. In §4 I argue that agents that adopt a monist stance towards a phenomenon 𝑋 are prone
to be dialectically biased in argumentative discussions about theories of 𝑋. In §5 I argue that an
agnostic pluralist approach is less prone to dialectical biases than the monist approach. In §6 I
conclude by discussing how internalizing a default agnostic pluralist approach to inquiry can be
employed as a bias mitigation strategy that does not possess some of the problems that other bias
mitigation strategies are known to possess.
2. What is dialectical bias?
I define the notion of dialectical bias as follows
(Dialectical-Bias). An agent 𝑆 is dialectically-biased with respect to some theory
𝑇 of some phenomenon 𝑋 if, and only if, in argumentative discussions for and
against 𝑇 more of 𝑆’s cognitive effort is directed towards establishing evidence
and arguments that support 𝑇 rather than the negation of 𝑇, or more of 𝑆’s
cognitive effort is directed towards establishing evidence and arguments that
support the negation of 𝑇 rather than 𝑇.
For the purposes in this paper I am going to stipulate that a theory is a set of propositions
that are presented by some agent or group of agents as explaining some phenomenon or set of
phenomena. For example, the theory of evolution is a set of propositions, first presented by
Charles Darwin (2008) that explains, among other things, species diversity. John Stewart Mill’s
(2003) variant of utilitarianism is a set of propositions that was first presented by him to explain
moral goodness, and Epistemicism is set of propositions put forward by, among others, Timothy
Bondy, P., & Benacquista, L. (Eds.). Argumentation, Objectivity, and Bias: Proceedings of the 11 th International
Conference of the Ontario Society for the Study of Argumentation (OSSA), 18-21 May 2016. Windsor, ON: OSSA,
pp. 1-11.
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Williamson (1996) to explain linguistic vagueness.1 Also note that the definition of dialectical
bias employs the notion of cognitive effort. Cognitive effort includes thinking, considering,
focusing and other sorts of mental activity. What the definition of dialectical bias suggests is
that, when one is dialectically biased in an argumentative discussion, ones intellectual energy
and capacity is either being disproportionately directed towards establishing the claim as
opposed to its negation or to establishing the claim’s negation as opposed to the claim. Plausibly
giving equal consideration to theories vying for our endorsement is an epistemic virtue. In so far
as an agent is dialectically biased they fail to possess this epistemic virtue. Of course after
adequate consideration and deliberation it may become clear that reasonable agents should be
convinced of 𝑇 (or convinced of 𝑇’s negation). In such circumstances dialectical bias is plausibly
warranted. For example, one is warranted in being dialectically biased against the claim that
phrenology has an important role in explaining human cognition. Similarly one is warranted in
being dialectically biased towards the anthropogenic theory of climate change, or in the theory of
evolution.
It is important to recognize that being dialectically biased with respect to a theory 𝑇 does
not imply that one is mistaken about 𝑇. It does not imply that one’s arguments for 𝑇 or against 𝑇
are not cogent or that one’s evidence is not sufficient to justify ones position with respect to 𝑇.
Moreover, it is possible for someone that is not dialectically biased with respect to 𝑇 to adopt a
false position about 𝑇 and to employ non-cogent arguments to support the false position they
adopt. Dialectical bias is primarily a problem in circumstances in which the bias it is not
warranted. For example, consider an agent 𝑆 who is personally invested in the truth of theory 𝑇of
some phenomenon 𝑋. Suppose 𝑆 encounters a case that appears plausible, given everything that
𝑆 knows about 𝑋, that ¬𝑇. In such circumstances the epistemically reasonable response would
be to assign equal cognitive effort to the evaluation of ¬𝑇 as well as ¬¬𝑇. However, if 𝑆 is
dialectically biased and spends more cognitive effort on the latter, then it is plausible that 𝑆 is not
acting in an epistemically responsible fashion qua knower and arguer.
Aside personal investment in a particular account of a phenomenon there are a variety of
other factors that cause unwarranted dialectical biases. Other biases, either implicit or explicit,
against the race, gender or class of one’s interlocutor can lead one to unduly assign less
epistemic credibility to one’s interlocutor than is warranted (Fricker, 2007; Bondy, 2010). In an
exchange of reasons for and against a theory these biases can impact the amount of cognitive
effort that some agent puts into affirming or refuting the theory in question. An agent that
possesses tendencies to degrade the epistemic credibility of persons with a certain social group
identity may reactively put greater emphasis on undercutting opinions put forward by persons
with that group identity than on the arguments and evidence that supports these opinions.2
It is both arrogant and deceptive to believe oneself less susceptible to these sorts of
biases. It is arrogant because one would conceive of oneself as less susceptible to a common and
pervasive tendency of human beings to have implicit biases towards members of certain groups.
It is deceptive because it is plausible that even people who would like to be non-prejudiced can
have prejudicial responses to persons with certain group identities (Miller, 2006). Individuals can
easily come to falsely believe that they have debiased when they have not. Often persons come
to believe that they are less biased with respect to an issue if they have deliberately made an
effort to eliminate the biases in question. However, as Kenyon and Beaulac (2014) point out,
“Telling ourselves that we have debiased, we can come to hold our attitudes and views more
1
2

I use the terms ‘theory,’ ‘account,’ and ‘viewpoint’ interchangeably.
By undercut a claim or theory I mean provide support the claim or theory’s negation.
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strongly—convinced that they have been vetted for distortion” (p. 347). Therefore, it is
worthwhile being explicit that I do not think that the agnostic pluralist is in a position, nor should
they believe themselves to be in a position, that is any less likely to be subject to racial, gender,
class and similar biases than the monist. Rather the purpose here is to advance a hypothesis that
dialectical obligations incurred by adopting a monist’s approach to an inquiry is more likely to
lead to certain dialectical biases than an agnostic pluralist’s approach to an inquiry. In
circumstances where the agent has adequate evidence to support a monist position about the
phenomenon under discussion such dialectical bias is warranted. In circumstances in which
monism is not the correct view such dialectical biases is not warranted.
3. The monist and agnostic pluralist approaches to inquiry
What is the difference between agnostic pluralist and monist approaches to inquiry? Consider an
agent 𝑆 who believes that
(1) There is only one correct account of 𝑋.
Suppose 𝑋 is moral goodness and 𝑆 also believes that
(2) Deontology is the correct account of moral goodness.
These two beliefs entail that
(3) Deontology is the only correct account of moral goodness
Similarly suppose 𝑋 is linguistic vagueness and 𝑆 believed that
(4) Epistemicism is the correct account of linguistic vagueness.
Beliefs (1) and (4) entail
(5) Epistemicism is the only correct account of vagueness.
An inquirer that adopts (1), at least as an implicit background assumption, about some
phenomenon 𝑋 is a monist about 𝑋. For example, someone that holds that classical logic is the
only correct theory of logical consequence would be a monist about logical consequence. A
pluralist about 𝑋 holds, at least as an implicit background assumption, the view that there is
more than one correct theory of 𝑋. For example, someone that held that classical logic,
intuitionistic logic, and relevance logic are correct theories of logical consequence is a pluralist
about logical consequence.3 I call an agnostic pluralist about 𝑋 an inquirer that withholds, in a
certain way, from (1). An agnostic pluralist neither assumes that there is only one correct
account of 𝑋 nor assumes that there is more than one correct account of 𝑋. More specifically, the
agnostic pluralist’s position with respect to some 𝑋 is that (i) it is possible for either monism or
pluralism to be true with respect to 𝑋 and (ii) they don’t know whether monism or pluralism is
3

For discussions of different versions of logical pluralism see Keefe (2014), Beall and Restall (2006), DeVidi
(2011), Shapiro (2014), and Pedersen (2014).
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true with respect to 𝑋. Holding this position is entirely compatible with coming to know that
monism or pluralism holds for some given 𝑋. Thus, an agnostic pluralist about some
phenomenon 𝑋 can become a monist about 𝑋 if they become convinced that there is only one
correct account of 𝑋. An agnostic pluralist could also become a pluralist about 𝑋 if they became
convinced that there is more than one correct account of 𝑋.
Suppose an agent Q is an agnostic pluralist with respect to moral goodness and linguistic
vagueness. Suppose such an agnostic pluralist became convinced that the deontological account
of moral goodness and the epistemic account of linguistic vagueness are correct accounts of
these respective phenomena. The propositions (3) and (5) are not entailed by the agnostic
pluralist’s beliefs. Of course, rather than (2) and (4) the agnostic pluralist should affirm
propositions like
(6) Deontology is a correct account of moral goodness.
And
(7) Epistemicism is a correct account of vagueness.
In other words the agnostic pluralist should, in these circumstances, employ the indefinite article
rather than the definite article. 4
It is important to note that even though the agnostic pluralist should avoid affirming (2)
and (4) it doesn’t follow that the agnostic pluralist should deny (2) and (4). From the agnostic
pluralist perspective, with respect to a phenomenon 𝑋, it is possible that there is more than one
correct theory of 𝑋. It is also possible that there is only one correct theory of 𝑋. Thus, given that,
for all they know, there may only be one theory of 𝑋, the agnostic pluralist should not deny (2)
and (4).5
4. The Monist is prone to dialectical bias
Consider a discussion between Buddy and Amber about the correct account of moral goodness.
Buddy is a monist and endorses deontology (so believes (1) and endorses (2)). Amber endorses
utilitarianism. Suppose that in an argumentative discussion between Amber and Buddy Amber
4

Why should Q should affirm (6) and (7) as opposed to (2) and (4)? Q believes that there exists at least one correct
theory of moral goodness and that that theory is deontology. However, 𝑄 is unsure if there is more than one correct
theory of moral goodness or if deontology is the only correct theory of moral goodness. She also believes that it is
possible that more than one theory of moral goodness and linguistic vagueness are correct. Given that 𝑄 does not
know whether there is only one account of moral goodness and linguistic vagueness, she should avoid taking on a
commitment to monism about these phenomena. In an argumentative discussion the affirmation of (2) and (4) would
produce a commitment for 𝑄 to the notion that there is only one correct theory of these respective phenomena. Thus,
given that 𝑄 should avoid taking on such a commitment she should avoid affirming (2) and (4). However, in using
the indefinite article, as in (6) and (7), 𝑄 would not thereby commit herself to the view that there are several correct
theories of the phenomenon in question. Rather, (6) is compatible with deontology turning out to be the only correct
theory of moral goodness. Thus, in order to remain neutral with respect to (1) the agnostic pluralist should employ
claims such as (6) and (7) as opposed to (2) and (4).
5
It is worthwhile noting that while the phenomenon under investigation may be of philosophical interest (such as
moral goodness or linguistic vagueness) they could also be phenomena that are of interest in disciplines aside from
philosophy. For example, the phenomenon of interest may be the cause of the great depression, the effect of
cognitive-behavioral therapy on anxiety disorders, or the ideal response to human caused climate change.
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asserts that utilitarianism is a correct theory of moral goodness and proceeds to present several
arguments in support of that claim. These arguments strike Buddy as plausible given everything
that he knows about moral goodness. However, Buddy is a monist about moral goodness and has
endorsed deontology.
Buddy possesses an obligation, within the context of the argumentative discussion with
Amber, to either abandon monism, revise his commitment to deontology, or undercut Amber’s
case for utilitarianism. Amber’s contention that utilitarianism is a correct account of moral
goodness cannot be added to the common ground in the discussion between Amber and Buddy
without Buddy either abandoning his commitments to (1) or his commitment to (2). Thus, in so
far as Buddy maintains his monist commitment and his commitment to deontology he has a
dialectical obligation to support the negation of,
(8) Utilitarianism is a correct account of moral goodness.
Suppose Buddy is highly invested in the view that deontology is the correct theory of moral
goodness. Perhaps Buddy is known to advocate a deontological approach and has endorsed the
view in many conversations. It is even be possible that Buddy’s professional reputation is
importantly impacted by deontology being correct. Perhaps Buddy is an ethicist who has written
several articles supporting deontology against various objections. I contend that, in such
circumstances, the presence of this dialectical obligation results in a form of dialectical pressure
on Buddy to support the negation of (8) and that this pressure results in more cognitive effort
being placed on identifying arguments and evidence for the negation of (8) than on identifying
arguments and evidence that support (8).
What reason is there to think that the existence of a dialectical obligation to support a
claim or theory puts dialectical pressure on an agent to support the claim or theory? I regard a
dialectical obligation to be a responsibility that arguers acquire in the context of an
argumentative discussion to either support a claim or theory or a responsibility that arguers
acquire to revise their commitment to a claim or theory. If an agent does not satisfy a dialectical
obligation to support a claim or to revise their commitment to a claim, then they are not
operating as a reasonable participant in the argumentative discussion. For instance, if an agent
makes a claim in an argumentative discussion and compelling reasoning is given that undercuts
the claim, the agent is responsible for either revising the claim made or for undercutting the
reasons given against the claim.6 In order for the agent to maintain their status as a reasonable
agent they will have to satisfy at least one of those responsibilities. Similarly, if a reasonable
agent makes a claim and compelling reasoning is provided that this claim entails another claim,
then the agent is responsible, if required, to either support the entailed claim or revise their
commitment to the initial claim. I understand dialectical pressure to be an inclination to support
or undercut a claim or theory that arises out of commitments adopted and obligations incurred
within an argumentative discussion. Plausibly this inclination emerges as a result of a desire to
maintain ones reputation as a reasonable discussant, as well as a strong aversion to being
6

That is to say the agent is obliged to either revise the claim in question, support the negation of the reasons given to
undercut the claim in question, or support the negation of the claim that the premises provide sufficient support for
the claim in question. Note that an agent could also reasonably reply by noting that they are presently unaware of
exactly how to respond and the issue will require further thought and consideration on their behalf. In the latter case
there is a temporary timeout in the argumentation, but the person who takes the time out will, when the
argumentation resumes, have to satisfy their dialectical obligations.
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regarded as an unreasonable discussant. An agent that desires to maintain their status as a
reasonable participant will be strongly inclined to satisfy her dialectical obligations. Thus,
commonly, agents who incur dialectical obligations to support a claim will experience dialectical
pressure to support the claim.7
The case that the monist incurs a dialectical obligation to undercut conflicting views that
produces dialectical pressure to support the negation of the conflicting viewpoints does not
establish that any agent that adopts a monistic perspective will experience pressure to undercut
the plausibility of conflicting viewpoints.8 Typically individuals that do feel pressure to undercut
the plausibility of conflicting alternative views are individuals that possess a strong desire to be
reasonable discussants as well as a strong aversion to being unreasonable discussants.
Furthermore, the preceding case does not establish that any monist that experiences dialectical
7

By way of example consider a discussion in which an agent has endorsed a theory and is strongly invested in the
truth of the theory. Suppose that an alternative theory that conflicts with the theory the agent has endorsed is
presented and that, given everything the agent knows about the phenomenon, appears plausible. Further suppose that
the agent is operating within a monist framework and possesses the at least implicit assumption that there is one
correct theory of the phenomenon in question. If the agent is personally invested in the theory, and is unlikely to
abandon the theory, the agent would be dialectically obliged to undercut the alternative theory. In such a
circumstance I submit that the agent experiences a palatable sense of dialectical pressure to undercut the alternative
theory. While the agent desires to be a reasonable participant in the discussion, if she does not either abandon the
view with which she is invested or undercut the alternative view, then her status as a reasonable agent with respect
to the issue under discussion is in jeopardy. Plausibly, an agent that did not either revise their endorsement of the
theory with which they are invested, adopt the alternative theory, or undercut the alternative theory could be
regarded as unreasonable since she would have left unsatisfied dialectical obligations that she incurred in the
argumentative discussion. Given that arguers typically desire to be regarded as reasonable and are strongly averse to
being regarded as unreasonable it is natural that arguers would experience a sense of pressure to be regarded as
reasonable and satisfy their dialectical obligations. Of course, one option to maintain one’s status as a reasonable
agent would be to simply adopt the alternative theory or abandon the theory in which one is invested. However,
there are at least two reasons why arguers would be reluctant to take these options. First, it is not clear that one
ought to abandon a preferred theory when only presented with preliminary arguments for the alternative theory’s
correctness. Second, argumentative discussion is often cast as a competition between opponents or adversaries. If
one of the parties in the argumentation successfully changes the mind of the other party, then the one party is
regarded as wining the argumentation and the other as having lost the argumentation. Furthermore, comparative
assessments of intelligence and competence are often made when one agent wins an argumentation over another
agent. Thus, agents will be strongly inclined not to abandon views that they have already committed themselves to
for risk of being regarded as less competent with respect to the issue under consideration. Thus, when facing a
plausible theory that conflicts with a theory to which an individual is committed, one’s desire to be reasonable and
one’s aversion to being unreasonable typically manifests as a strong inclination to undercut the plausibility of the
conflicting theory. One could maintain their status as a reasonable agent by abandoning the theory in whose truth
they are invested. However, given the adversarial view of argumentation, adopting such a route could result in the
agent being regarded as less competent with respect to the issue under discussion. Commonly the strong inclination
to undercut the plausibility of conflicting theories results in more cognitive effort being assigned to supporting the
negation of the conflicting theory than to supporting the conflicting theory itself.
8
Some individuals may not desire to be regarded as reasonable nor even be concerned with being regarded as
unreasonable. Such individuals may have various strategic objectives during an argumentative discussion. For
example, consider a politician whose primary objective is to secure votes and get elected. One way that politicians
go about acquiring increased popularity is by standing firm on popular views (or even just views popular with those
who might consider voting for them) even in the face of reasonable and better alternatives to these popular views.
Thus, a politician may not feel any particular pressure to respond to unpopular or unfamiliar views that conflict with
the popular views that they advocate. On the contrary, the politician will simply take advantage of the opportunity to
reaffirm their commitment to the popular view that they endorse without engaging the alternative view on its
rational merits. Individuals that will feel pressure to undercut the plausibility of conflicting alternative views are
individuals that have a strong desire to be reasonable participants in an argumentative discussion.
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pressure will respond by being dialectically biased. An ideally rational agent, in spite of pressure
to undercut a conflicting theory, would assign equal cognitive effort to identifying reasons to
support and to undercut the theory under discussion. This ideal would apply just as much to
monists as it would to pluralists and agnostic pluralists.
However, it is not clear that there is good reason to believe that arguers in general satisfy
this ideal. Typically, in circumstances where one has become invested in the truth of a theory,
agents deviate from this ideal and spend increased cognitive effort in undercutting conflicting
theories than they do in supporting them. Admittedly this is a pseudo-empirical hypothesis that
would have to be verified. However, I believe that honest phenomenological self-reflection
should provide some verification of the tendency to respond to the dialectical pressure to
undercut conflicting theories by reactively assigning more cognitive effort to undercut
conflicting viewpoints than to supporting them. Moreover, it is likely to be highly deceptive to
believe of oneself that one is not subject to dialectical bias in the sort circumstances outlined.
Knowing that we do experience a strong pressure to undercut views that conflict with those that
we are invested in should give us pause as to whether we are behaving neutrally with respect to
our evaluation of conflicting views. Just as believing that we have extracted ourselves from a
gender, racial, or class bias can unwittingly cement a biased judgment (Kenyon & Beaulac,
2014), the belief that we are fairly and evenly evaluating a conflicting view could cement
existing dialectical bias.
Given these qualifications the preceding case alone will not establish that agents that
adopt monism towards a phenomenon will be dialectical biased with respect to their preferred
account of that phenomenon. However, agents who subscribe to monism and desire to maintain
their status as reasonable agents will experience dialectical pressure to undercut conflicting
viewpoints. Moreover, given that in the presence of dialectical pressure it is very plausible that
agents deviate from the ideal of giving equal consideration to conflicting viewpoints, dialectical
pressure is likely to result in dialectical bias. Therefore, even if some monists avoid dialectical
bias, I think it is reasonable to conclude that agents that adopt a monist position with respect to
some phenomenon are prone to dialectical bias.
5. Agnostic pluralists are less prone to dialectical bias than monists
The considerations in the previous section raise the question: is the agnostic pluralist, in
relevantly similar circumstances, subject to the same dialectical pressure to which the monist is
subject? I contend that, at least in circumstances similar to the example discussed above, the
agnostic pluralist is not subject to the same dialectical pressure as the monist. The reason for this
is that the agnostic pluralist is not forced to decide whether there is only one correct account of
the phenomenon in question or whether there are multiple correct accounts. For the agnostic
pluralist it is possible that there are multiple correct viewpoints on the issue being considered.
Thus, when confronting conflicting plausible viewpoints the agnostic pluralist can be open to the
possibility that the conflicting viewpoint is correct in addition to their preferred theory.
Consider again the example discussed above, but now let’s suppose that Buddy is an
agnostic pluralist about moral goodness rather than a monist. That is to say that Buddy does not
know whether there is only one correct account of moral goodness or whether there is more than
one correct account, but he believes that it is possible that there is more than one correct account.
In the example Buddy was a committed deontologist. In an argumentative discussion Buddy’s
interlocutor Amber contends that utilitarianism is a correct account of moral goodness and
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presents several arguments supporting her claim. Again these arguments strike Buddy as
plausible given everything that he knows about moral goodness.
Because Buddy is open to the possibility of there being multiple correct accounts of
moral goodness there is no particular reason to think that maintaining his status as a reasonable
discussant would require Buddy to either abandon deontology or to undercut the case for
utilitarianism. Given that Buddy is an agnostic pluralist it could turn out that both deontology
and utilitarianism are correct accounts of moral goodness. In order to determine if utilitarianism
is a correct account of moral goodness, presumably Buddy should assign equal cognitive effort
to considering the case for and against utilitarianism. In the context of the argumentative
discussion with Amber and Buddy we can contend that Amber has presented a plausible case for
utilitarianism, but that it need not undermine his support of deontology as a correct account of
moral goodness.
6. Default agnostic pluralism as a bias mitigation strategy
What is the upshot of recognizing that agnostic pluralists are less prone to some dialectical bias
than monists? One upshot of the preceding considerations is that they raise the prospect that
adopting a default agnostic pluralist attitude could be used as a strategy to mitigate some
dialectical bias. A default agnostic pluralist attitude involves approaching any enquiry with an
agnostic pluralist perspective. Approaching enquiry with this perspective entails believing that it
is possible for there to be several correct accounts of the phenomenon under investigation
without knowing whether there is multiple correct accounts of the phenomenon in question or
just one. Regarding this attitude as default means that it is operating as a background assumption
when approaching any investigation or enquiry in general.9
As noted agnostic pluralists will be subject to dialectical biases for a variety of reasons.
For instance, the agnostic pluralist could hold an implicit bias against various gender, racial,
ethnic or class groups.10 I don’t claim that adopting a default agnostic pluralist approach to
inquiry is particularly helpful at mitigating dialectical bias that is caused by these sorts of
implicit biases. Rather the claim is that adopting this view can relieve some dialectical pressure
that commonly leads enquirers to become dialectically biased with respect to conflicting views
presented in the context of an argumentative discussion. Rather than viewing conflicting
9

Of course, there could be compelling reason to abandon the default view and adopt monism or pluralism for the
phenomenon under investigation. However, default agnostic pluralism regards agnostic pluralism as the default
approach to inquiry about phenomena. Independent of compelling grounds to adopt monism or pluralism about
some phenomenon default agnostic pluralism holds that agnostic pluralism is the approach one should take to
inquiry about the phenomenon. My impression is that monism is frequently taken to be the correct default approach
to inquiry. If one believes that it is a genuine possibility for multiple accounts of some phenomenon to be correct,
one needs to argue for that claim. However, typically one does not need to argue for the view that there is only one
correct account of a phenomenon. It is often simply assumed that there is only one account of a phenomenon and
that different accounts of the phenomenon are rivals. However, for the agnostic pluralist does not make such an
assumption. Both monism and pluralism are views that require support.
10
As already noted in the body of the paper such implicit biases can lead agnostic pluralists just as well as it can
monists to assign less credibility than is warranted to members of groups against which they are biased. In an
argumentative discussion the agnostic pluralist may in turn assign disproportionate cognitive effort to undercutting
the views expressed by a member of a group against which they are biased. Furthermore, agnostic pluralists, like
monists, are not ideal agents and frequently make errors. For example, due to lack of attention an agnostic pluralist
could come to regard a theory as less plausible than she would have had she been paying more attention. This could
lead the agnostic pluralist to spend more time looking for reasons to undercut the view than supporting it.
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accounts as incompatible with ones preferred account the agnostic pluralist occupies a rational
space within which is it possible for ones view as well as one or more conflicting views to be
correct. Thus, rather than being pressed with the choice of either abandoning ones view or
undercutting a conflicting view, the agnostic pluralist can comfortably investigate conflicting
views without being concerned that their status as a reasonable discussant is in jeopardy.
According to Kenyon and Beaulac (2014), recent literature on the psychology of
debiasing
suggests that (for at least a wide class of biases) practically any debiasing strategy
intended to be learned and subsequently self-deployed by individuals acting alone,
at the point of making a judgment, is unlikely to succeed in significantly
minimizing bias (p. 343).
One of the advantages of adopting default agnostic pluralism is that it is not a strategy that one
would need to adopt and apply at the point of making a judgment. Adopting a default pluralist
approach to enquiry does not occur at the time of making a potentially biased judgment in the
heat of an argumentative discussion. In applying this bias mitigation strategy one does not aim to
avoid dialectical bias by consciously trying to extricate oneself from the bias. Rather the
proposal is that this bias mitigation strategy will operate in a more indirect way by neutralizing
dialectical pressure that is felt when responding to conflicting theories. One applies this bias
mitigation strategy by reaffirming in advance of any particular enquiry a default agnostic
pluralist stance. The thought is that once this point of view is internalized an enquirer will have a
rational space to evaluate conflicting views on their own merits without concern, at least initially,
that they threaten to undercut the inquirer’s preferred view.
It is difficult to determine the degree of success such an approach would have to
mitigating dialectical bias. As noted, it will not eliminate all causes of dialectical bias. However,
I submit that considerations made in this paper suggest that such an approach to inquiry could
lead to more frequently adopting a generous and fair-minded assessment of conflicting theories
than is found with a background assumption that there is only one correct account of the
phenomenon in question.
7. Conclusion
I have argued that an inquirer that possesses an agnostic pluralist stance towards a phenomenon
𝑋 is less prone to dialectical bias than an inquirer that adopts a monist stance towards 𝑋. The
reason for this is that participants in an argumentative discussion generally desire to maintain
their status as reasonable discussants and are averse to being regarded as unreasonable
discussants. In an argumentative discussion, an agent that has background monistic assumptions
about a phenomenon will either have to undercut a conflicting theory or revise their commitment
to their preferred theory in order to maintain their status as a reasonable discussant. I contend
that this commonly results in dialectical pressure to support the negation of the conflicting
theory. In turn dialectical pressure typically results in dialectical bias towards supporting the
negation of the conflicting theory. However, when presented with a conflicting theory in an
argumentative discussion, the agnostic pluralist can maintain their status as a reasonable agent
without abandoning their commitment to a favoured account of some phenomenon or
undercutting the conflicting theory. It is possible for the agnostic pluralist to maintain their status
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as a reasonable agent in such circumstances because she believes that it is possible for there to be
more than one correct account of the phenomenon under investigation. I concluded by suggesting
that one upshot of these considerations is that adopting a default agnostic pluralist approach to
inquiry could serve to mitigate some dialectical bias. One advantage that such an approach to
mitigating dialectical bias has is that it does not require the application of a bias mitigation
strategy at the moment of judgment. One would mitigate the bias in a more indirect manner by
adopting an approach to inquiry that releases dialectical pressure that commonly produces
dialectical bias. Whether or not such an approach is valuable would ultimately turn on empirical
study of dialectical bias and different approaches to mitigating this bias. However, I believe that
the arguments developed in this paper indicate that considering the adoption of default agnostic
pluralism as a bias mitigation strategy is worthwhile.
Acknowledgements: Thanks to Michael Lynch, Nathan Kellen, David Pruit and Hanna Gunn
for insightful discussions on this paper.
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